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THE FARM POLICY DEBATE OF 1949 .. 50 
PLAINS STATE REACTION TO THE BRANNAN PLAN 
VIRGIL W. DEAN 
A storm of controversy arose in April 1949 
when Secretary of Agriculture Charles F. 
Brannan unveiled the Truman administration's 
postwar policy for agriculture. The most con-
troversial aspect of the so-called Brannan plan 
was its production payments feature, a direct, 
undisguised farm subsidy designed to bring relief 
to producers and consumers alike. Other as-
pects of the complex plan also elicited both 
praise and blame, but disagreements during this 
fractious time were not limited to farm ques-
tions. In a year of apparent victories for the 
world's communist monolith, spy trials, and 
labor unrest, discussions of farm policy on the 
Great Plains and elsewhere were affected by the 
participants' general views of government in-
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tervention in the economy and particularly by 
their view of commodity stabilization as a form 
of socialism. 
Grassroots reaction to the Brannan plan 
varied widely: some of the farmers who wrote to 
Brannan praised him as a savior and the only 
man in Washington who cared about their 
problems; others were convinced that the vil-
lainous secretary and his contemptible plan 
threatened everything that was good about 
America. Theodore]. Regier, a Newton, Kan-
sas, area farmer, encouraged the secretary to 
"Keep on working" and wrote: "We want secu-
rity on the farm, even if we have to control 
production and have less freedom. A man in the 
middle of the ocean has a world of freedom but 
no security." ].]. Weber, an equally convinced 
north-central Kansas wheat farmer, wrote that 
as "a firm believer of supply and demand" he 
opposed the Brannan plan. "[M]y farm ... is all 
paid for and I do not need ... [or] want anyone 
to tell me how many acres I can plant. [T]his is 
suppose to be a free contry [sic] let us leave it 
that way."! 
In general, how did plains farmers react to 
this innovative policy proposal? And why did so 
many oppose what, on the surface at least, 
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seemed like an extremely generous agricultural 
program? Using Kansas as its primary example 
and Brannan's correspondence as its primary 
source, this essay offers some tentative answers 
to these questions. Although scientific analysis 
of this opinion (if indeed it is even possible) is 
beyond the scope of this study, a sampling is 
instructive. Attitudes toward Brannan's pro-
posal came in all shades and degrees of elo-
quence. A look at these divergent viewpoints 
can provide a window on the depth of disagree-
ment on agricultural issues and, by implication, 
a glimpse at attitudes affecting broader social 
and economic issues confronting postwar Ameri-
cans. 
EXISTING FARM POLICY 
Numerous domestic challenges confronted 
the United States in the wake of the Second 
World War as it sought to reconvert to a peace 
time economy. Agriculture was one of the many 
policy areas that demanded attention. Existing 
programs were based on New Deal legislation 
-most significantly, the Agricultural Adjust-
mentAct (AAA) of 1938-and emergency war-
time legislation designed to expire at the end of 
1948. Although the AAA was an omnibus 
agricultural measure, its most important legacy 
to the Brannan plan was the price support 
system based on a certain percent of "parity" for 
specified farm commodities; wheat and com 
were two of the so-called "basic commodities" 
on the original list, a list that grew in response 
to the United States' entry into the war. 
In 1941 and 1942 Congress passed legisla-
tion to encourage production of crops deemed 
vital to the war effort and to guarantee farmers 
some benefit from increased demand and war-
time spending by supporting numerous farm 
commodity prices at 90 percent of parity. By 
the end of 1942, supports were guaranteed for 
"basics" (wheat, com, cotton, rice, tobacco, 
and peanuts) and "non-basics" (milk, butterfat, 
chickens, eggs, turkeys, hogs, dry peas, soybeans 
for oil, flaxseed for oil, peanuts for oil, Ameri-
can-Egyptian cotton, sweet potatoes, and Irish 
potatoes}.2 
If price supports were simply extended, many 
believed the cost of the system soon would 
become prohibitive, resulting in a consumer or 
taxpayer revolt against the entire farm program. 
Farmers' successes exacerbated the problem. In 
the 1940s the nation was in the midst of what 
Wayne Rasmussen calls the second agricultural 
revolution-"the change from animal power to 
mechanical power and the adaptation of chem-
istry to agricultural production." Spectacular 
gains in farm productivity were already quite 
evident, and price-depressing farm surpluses 
loomed ever larger for the future.3 What was to 
be done? In essence, this was the core of the 
postwar debate. 
At issue was the "parity" concept, an idea 
that gained currency in the 1920s, was codified 
in the Agricultural Adjustment Acts of the 
1930s, and quickly became the cornerstone of 
the national farm program. The formula used to 
determine the level of support was a complex 
one, but, in its simplest terms, parity was the 
"ratio of equality" between the prices received 
by farmers for the commodities sold and the 
prices farmers paid for the goods and services 
they purchased. A base period, initially 1909-
14, was selected so the ratio could be deter-
mined in light of the constant fluctuation of 
prices.4 
Government price support programs based 
on a given"percentage of parity were particularly 
important to farmers in the wheat producing 
states of the Great Plains where over-depen-
dence on one-commodity agriculture made 
producers especially vulnerable to farm price 
fluctuations. Hard hit by depression and drought 
in the "Dirty Thirties," plains farmers generally 
appreciated New Deal programs that alleviated 
their suffering; but only favorable weather and 
the wartime demand of the early forties would 
return good times to their region. This boom 
period also brought a rapid increase in the 
application of new technologies, a favorable 
economic climate for stock raising, a consider-
able expansion of wheat acreage, a concomitant 
increase in production, and an acceleration in 
the trend toward fewer but larger farms. The 
continuation of prosperity during the immediate 
postwar years notwithstanding, farmers feared 
another depression. At the very least, they 
demanded a support system that would put a 
floor under certain commodity prices.s 
Whether on or off the farm, virtually every-
one agreed with Secretary Brannan that farmers 
confronted "disadvantaging economic circum-
stances" because of "the serious hazards result-
ing from unfavorable weather, floods," and their 
inability to make quick production adjustments. 
Brannan, a forty-five year old attorney from 
Denver, Colorado, had spent thirteen years in 
the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) administering New Deal action pro-
grams before his appointment to the department's 
top post in J.une 1948.6 Experience had taught 
him that peculiar circumstances entitled the 
farmer to special legislative consideration and, 
if necessary, assistance. In addition, like others 
of his generation, Brannan held to a concept of 
agrarianism that maintained "that the prosper-
ity of our agricultural producers is closely tied up 
with the prosperity of our entire country."7 
Nevertheless, common ground on specific 
program choices was illusive. Congressional 
ineptitude in this area can be partially ex-
plained by the fact that the so-called "farm 
problem" was actually a myriad of different 
problems, all of which resisted comprehensive 
solution. As the former chairman of the House 
Committee on Agriculture, Clifford R. Hope 
(R., Kans.), observed in 1949, it was, more 
accurately, "thirty-five or forty farm problems."8 
Hope, a widely respected congressional farm 
spokesman from western Kansas, had been 
searching for answers in behalf of farmers since 
the 1920s, and he was well aware of the problem's 
complexities. Not only did the problems differ 
for farmers from one commodity to another, but 
they also varied from region to region for pro-
ducers of any given commodity. In addition, the 
often discordant interests and opinions of pro-
cessors and consumers frequently compounded 
the problem and complicated the search for a 
solution. 
This long-standing reality was exacerbated 
by the wartime legislation that had extended 
high, "rigid," price support guarantees to a 
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FIG. 1. Republican Congressman Clifford R. Hope, 
Sr. , of Garden City, addressing a meeting of the Lane 
County Farm Bureau at Dighton in December of 1949. 
Photograph courtesy of Kansas State Historical 
Society. 
laundry list of previously uncovered commodi-
ties. The issue became the extent and level of 
commodity price supports, not the viability of 
the concept. A few farm advocates called for 
government support at 100 percent parity, but 
the most common point of contention in the 
postwar farm policy debate occurred between 
proponents of a fixed 90 percent of parity and 
those who favored a more flexible support sys-
tem. The question was no longer whether or !lot 
government had a role in agriculture, but what 
that role would be; and "the principal question 
with most farmers," wrote Congressman Hope, 
"is not whether they are entitled to 90% of 
parity, but the method to be used in giving it to 
them."9 
Under the circumstances, it is not surprising 
that the Agricultural Act of 1948 (Hope-Aiken 
Act), the nation's first shot at a long-range, 
postwar policy for agriculture, was at best a 
hybridized piece of farm legislation. Title I, the 
Hope portion of the new law, simply extended 
existing legislation through 1949, while Titles 
II and III, named for their principal sponsor, 
Senator George Aiken (R., Yt.), implemented 
a long-range price support program based on a 
new formula for computing parity and a plan for 
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FIG. 2. During the campaign of 1948, President 
Truman made an important farm speech and appear-
ance at the National Plowing Contest at Dexter, Iowa, 
on 18 September 1948. Here the President shakes 
hands with farmers Ronald H. Orr, Beatrice, Nebraska, 
and Charles G. Long, Bethany, Missouri, the defending 
and current plow champions. Associa ted Press 
photograph courtesy of Harry S. Truman library. 
a flexible or sliding scale ranging from 60 to 90 
percent of parity for most major crops. Accord-
ing to Representative Harold Cooley, the con-
ference committee had labored for many long 
hours only to bring "forth a monstrosity." As 
Stephen Pace, another Democratic opponent, 
explained, "The House passed a bill, the Senate 
passed a bill, and the compromise is to enact 
both of them." Even Congressman Hope, who 
had come early to the position that more time 
was needed to study changing conditions before 
permanent legislation was passed, described the 
Aiken bill as "a hastily gotten up concoction, 
full of contradictions and weak spotS."1O 
The failings of the Republican 80th Con-
gress, the politicization of agricultural issues in 
the fall campaign, and the Democratic election 
successes in 1948 made a renewed long-range 
farm policy search inevitable. Not only had 
Democrats recaptured majority control of the 
Congress, they had reelected a president. Kan-
sas, Nebraska, and the Dakotas went Republi-
can as they had in the previous election; but 
President Truman held many of the midwestern 
and western states that Franklin Roosevelt had 
carried and recaptured Colorado, Iowa, Ohio, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming, which had gone 
back to the Republicans in 1944. Truman's 
surprising November victory, due in part to an 
aggressive farm state campaign, left many, 
including the president and the secretary of 
agriculture, with the impression that the admin-
istration had received a mandate to change the 
country's farm policy. II 
THE BRANNAN PLAN 
Secretary Brannan interpreted and gave life 
to that mandate-whether it was real or imag-
ined. On 7 April 1949 he appeared before a 
joint session of the House and Senate agricul-
ture committees to discuss some of the 
administration's "views and recommendations" 
with regard to price supports, "the heart of our 
farm policy."12 
The essence of Brannan's proposal contained 
four basic elements: 1) a new standard of 
support based on income rather than price 
criteria, which represented "a realistic mini-
mum below which it is not in the interest of 
farmers or consumers to allow farm prices to 
fall"; 2) a more recent, realistic, moving ten 
year base period (initially 1939 through 1948) 
for computing the new income support stan-
dard; 3) support accomplished through the use 
of loans, purchase agreements, production pay-
ments, and direct purchases; and 4) eligibility 
for price support limited to producers who prac-
ticed good soil conservation and did not exceed 
a predetermined level ofproduction-"a volume 
high enough to benefit most farms but one 
which will not encourage the development of 
extremely large, industrialized farming."13 
Brannan's proposal was complex and many 
faceted, but the new plan's most controversial 
component was the secretary's scheme for offer-
ing relief to both consumers and producers. 
"Non-perishable" or "storable" commodities 
were to be supported in much the same way as 
they had been under existing legislation (loans, 
purchase agreements, and direct purchases), but 
"perishable" commodities would be supported 
under a new system of "production" or "income 
payments." In practice, a support standard 
would be determined by the Secretary of Agri-
culture, and a direct payment would be made to 
the producer to make up the difference between 
the standard and the market price of that com-
modity. This was an undisguised government 
subsidy to the farmer, in itself a hard pill for 
many inside and outside farm circles to swallow, 
and a consumer subsidy, anathema to most 
conservatives. 
A second.provision, which also proved quite 
controversial, was designed to encourage the 
"family-sized farm" by denying government sup-
port beyond a certain level of production. In an 
effort to coopt those groups most likely to 
oppose this particular concept, Brannan wrapped 
his explanation in a cloak of American idealism 
and agrarian fundamentalism. "One bulwark of 
democracy," Brannan proclaimed, "may be 
found in the prosperous rural community mainly 
composed of economically strong families farm-
ing in the traditional American pattern. It is an 
ever-present answer to communism." By limit-
ing "eligibility for price support to a defined 
volume of production on each farm," Brannan 
believed the government could avoid encourag-
ing "large, industrial farming" and still help 
most farmers who were relatively small scale 
producers. 14 
In principle there was little new in Brannan's 
proposal, but in practice the plan's emphasis 
and scope were significant departures from pre-
vious programs. The new support standard was 
to be used to support a much longer list of 
commodities at what amounted to 100 percent 
of parity. At minimum, Brannan believed his 
"first-priority, or group 1" commodities should 
include corn, wheat, cotton, tobacco, whole 
milk, eggs, farm chickens, hogs, beef cattle, and 
lambs. Other farm products would receive 
commensurate support if funds were available. 
The secretary hoped that his plan would be the 
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culmination of the lengthy and often politically 
explosive postwar search for a solution to the 
"farm problem."15 Instead the "Brannan plan" 
touched off a political firestorm. 
CONGRESSMAN HOPE AND RESPONSE TO 
THE BRANNAN PLAN 
National reaction registered quickly. A New 
York Times editorial called the administration 
plan a "political maneuver," and other news 
agencies claimed that its real author was the 
"radical" National Farmers Union (NFU). In 
addition, a steady stream of letters and tele-
grams began arriving at the USDA and the 
White House on the day following Brannan's 
committee appearance. Members of Congress 
were also understandably concerned. Congress-
man Hope commented on the production pay-
ment feature of the proposed plan in the first 
letter he wrote after Secretary Brannan's pre-
sentation: "Farmers generally," Hope believed, 
would "oppose the cash subsidy plan because 
they will feel there is no certainty of it being put 
in operation." It would be wholly dependent on 
annual appropriations and farmers would have 
no way of knowing, at planting time, if pay-
ments actually would be forthcoming. "Fur-
thermore, most farmers consider a payment of 
that kind a consumer subsidy rather than a farm 
subsidy." Nevertheless, Hope assured his 
correspondent that the House Committee on 
Agriculture would give all the secretary's rec-
ommendations careful consideration.16 
Although he later became a staunch oppo-
nent of the secretary's plan, Hope was undoubt-
edly sincere in his promise of objectivity. The 
congressman had been disquieted by the 
administration's injection of partisanship into 
the farm policy debate during the previous 
campaign, but he was also "terribly disappointed 
in Allan Kline," the conservative, "free trade" 
president of the American Farm Bureau Federa-
tion (AFBF). Hope believed that Kline, who 
was philosophically opposed to all federal sub-
sidies and accompanying regulations, was forc-
ing his position on the entire organization. "It 
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isn't simply a question of what the support levels 
will be but it is a question of whether a little 
group of leaders who are entirely out of touch 
with the thinking of people on the farms are 
going to dictate farm legislation." Hope was not 
yet sure what should be done with regard to price 
policy, "but if we are going to have all the 
controls that are contained in the Aiken bill we 
might just as well have 90% of parity price 
supports and let the farmer be getting something 
out of it."17 
These words, written in "confidence" less 
than two months before Brannan's policy an-
nouncement, reveal considerable common 
ground between the congressman and the secre-
tary of agriculture. Hope had previously ex-
pressed support for production payments. 18 By 
1 anuary 1949 he had come to the conclusion 
that farmers were willing to accept more con-
trols, although his mail was running in all 
directions; he was upset with the AFBF's in-
transigence; and, he was definitely committed 
to changing the Aiken bil1. 19 Despite the parti-
sanship of the past campaign, Hope respected 
Brannan and expressed considerable con-
fidence in his efforts to find a solution for the 
price support problem. "I know that Secretary 
Brannan is giving a great deal of though[t] and 
study to the matter," he wrote on 3 February, 
"and that he has the best brains in the Depart-
ment working on it now. I am sure he wants to 
do everything possible to work out a solution to 
the question."2o 
This conciliatory tone notwithstanding, 
within hours of the secretary's initial committee 
presentation two months later, the battle lines 
were drawn, and Hope was in opposition. Al-
though the debate intensified as lawmakers and 
the general public began to focus on specific 
legislation, the pros and cons remained surpris-
ingly constant. Truman and Brannan labored to 
convince the nation that the Brannan plan was 
not a new approach, but in many ways the 
administration's proposed program was in fact a 
sharp departure from previous policy.21 The 
controversial "production payments" were not 
new to the table, but in the Brannan plan they 
were a centerpiece. 
The big differences were in emphasis, un-
precedented high levels of support and manda-
tory supports for many perishable commodities. 
As Congressman Hope explained, "It is the 
slant which the Secretary has put on the matter 
that disturbs me."Z2 "[U]ntil Secretary Brannan 
came along with his proposal," Hope reasoned, 
"no one ever had any idea that payments would 
be used to the extent that he suggests."23 It was 
this "slant" that disturbed many and excited 
others, and a number of interested Kansans took 
the time to express their considered opinions, 
both pro and con. These reactions ran the 
gamut of public opinion and, on the whole, 
fairly reflect the many different attitudes ex-
pressed throughout the region, as well as the 
nation. 
RESPONSES FROM KANSANS 
Taking a pro-administration line, 1. A. Meyer 
of Riley informed the secretary that Allan Kline 
and the Farm Bureau were under the influence 
of the 2 percent of big farmers "that has least to 
benefit from the [new] program." Mrs. Thomas 
Williams, from western Kansas, agreed: "We 
have always paid Our Dues to the Farm Bureau 
but cant see any benefit in it for us: the way I see 
that other plan [Aiken Act?] is to help the rich 
wheat farmer while it makes it harder every day 
for the little man to have a lob or money to buy 
his groceries .... I know all the little people are 
left holding the bag again: the rich are always 
protected. "24 
This hostility toward the Farm Bureau, the 
most influential farm organization in the state 
and the nation, was also reflected in a 6 May 
1949 letter to Secretary Brannan from Hiawatha 
farmer Hugh Craig, who believed the Brannan 
plan had the support of most dirt farmers. "It is 
epochal and strikingly constructive and worthy 
of a place beside President Truman's declara-
tion of intention to fight global poverty," he 
wrote. "P.S. As a member of the American 
Farm Bureau Federation, I resent Allan B. Kline's 
utterances." Three months later, in a letter to 
former Kansas Senator Arthur Capper, who was 
spending much of his first year of retirement 
FIG.~ . A Nebraska native, AllanB . Kline graduated 
from Iowa State College and subsequently established 
himself as farmer/stockman in Benton County, Iowa. 
He became active in the local Farm Bureau, served as 
vice-president and president of the state federation, and 
was elected president of the AFBF in 1947. Photo-
graph courtesy of Kansas Farm Bureau. 
attacking the Brannan initiative, Craig asked 
why the farmer should not "have a fair share of 
the national income." His homey, handwritten 
letter conveyed "liberal" views that nearly par-
alleled those of the Farmers Union. Craig 
insisted that the "principle of parity" repre-
sented a "price to the farmer that would give 
him approximately a fair share of the national 
income," and therefore he should receive 100 
percent of parity. He believed "subsidization" 
had become "a cardinal principle of the Repub-
lican party," enjoyed by business through the 
protective tariff for many years.2S 
"The real objection to [the] Brannan Plan 
among those who are fighting it for other than 
personal reasons," wrote Craig, 
is because of its implications. They fear a 
national policy that will adopt a broader 
conception of human rights and of greater 
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service by the state to the individual and that 
may entail compelling the wealthier of our 
citizens to bear a greater share of the national 
burden than they do now. 
Craig believed the opposition's cry about "sa-
cred property rights" was a position "worthy of 
the Dark Ages" and insisted that "free lunch for 
school children" carried with it just as many 
"dangers of state socialism" as the farm plan 
under consideration. He closed this Populistic 
epistle as follows: 
If our wealthier people would be willing to 
remedy injustice against human rights at 
some expense to themselves, they would not 
need ro fear radical socialism or communism, 
it seems to me. By opposing doing the above, 
they are inviting everything they fear. 
The Republican Party is too much under 
the influence of reactionary wealth and self-
ish commercialism. It was founded as a 
liberal party and its great leader Abraham 
Lincoln typified that spirit. Unless it returns 
to its early principles, its days of glory are 
gone and its expectancy is short.26 
Capper's rebuttal was based primarily on his 
belief that it was not "healthy for the farmer, or 
for the consumer, or for the country, to have the 
farmer dependent upon the Federal Treasury for 
his income, and the consumer dependent upon 
the Federal Treasury for part of his grocery bill." 
He believed "it a dangerous philosophy that 
Government owes you or me a living" and that 
the Federal Treasury could [not] long stand 
the load of supporting any considerable group 
of people in this country. In times of distress, 
we may yield to necessity. But to draw upon 
the Treasury to sustain the artificially high 
income levels of the war and postwar years 
-it just can't [and "won't"] workY 
Unfortunately for the administration, 
Capper's judgment mirrored more public opin-
ion than did Craig's. Across the Plains (and 
nation) many people found considerable 
40 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, WINTER 1993 
relevance in the opinions expressed by the 
former senator. A Chase County, Kansas, 
farmer informed the secretary that everyone he 
talked to opposed the Brannan plan and, al-
though he had voted Democratic all his life, he 
was making the switch. "If you want to make 
regimented peasants out of the farmer," he 
wrote, "every man with a backbone will be your 
foe." Mrs. Morris Campbell of Lamed insisted 
that "no one, but a complete moron could 
believe you can have cheap food for consumers 
and high prices for producers .... You men in 
Washington yap about the Reds & are getting 
our country the same way."28 
Many other observers and participants in the 
farm debate echoed similar attitudes. One 
western Kansas newspaper editorialized that the 
government had a role in agriculture, but "Aid 
and assistance can't ... long be given without 
dictation of what to do and ... when to do it. If 
the administration's program gets through Con-
gress," editor Victor C. Leiker insisted, "the 
farmer of America will be the most regimented 
group our country has ever seen .... If the plan 
goes through it will be just another step toward 
socialization. "29 
THE KANSAS CONGRESSIONAL 
DELEGATION 
The entire Kansas congressional delegation 
also espoused this attitude, opposing, without 
exception, the Brannan plan. Sixth District 
Representative Wint Smith of Mankato was 
obsessed with "creeping socialism" and the do-
mestic Communist threat. He disputed virtu-
ally all of the administration's foreign policy 
initiatives and was "unalterably opposed to any 
of the so-called Fair Deal ideas about social 
legislation." The Brannan plan was just another 
of these "socialistic scheme[s]," endorsed first 
by organized labor "simply to get cheaper food" 
at taxpayer expense.30 
Representative Hope thought "the matter 
should be carefully studied in Congress" but was 
"dubious about any farm plan which has to be 
carried out by means of payments to producers." 
The congressman was apprehensive about a 
proposal that so closely resembled the British 
system. "It is in effect a subsidy to the con-
sumer," he reasoned, 
and apparently in England the consumers 
have gotten so fond of the subsidy that any 
talk about raising prices brings a threat of a 
political revolt .... The thing that bothers 
me is that if we start such a program here and 
consumers adjust themselves to the subsi-
dized prices, the chances are we will never 
get rid of them. 
A week later Hope wrote "the Brannan plan ... 
would, in my opinion, bring about a situation 
very much the same as the farmers in England 
are confronted with at the present time, which 
is total control of their farming operations."3l 
INFORMING THE FARMERS 
Throughout the farm policy debate of 1949 
and early 1950, Secretary Brannan repeatedly 
expressed the belief that the public, especially 
the farmers, would support his program if they 
better understood the issue. This was an overly 
optimistic assessment, but some of the secretary's 
mail did reflect a degree of understandable 
confusion, and there were some instances of 
"conversion" that undoubtedly reinforced the 
department's belief that education was the key 
to success. One such "convert," D. H. Richert 
of North Newton, Kansas, wrote the secretary 
expressing the commonly held concern that the 
new plan would lead to excessive regimentation 
or government control of America's farms. In 
his reply Brannan thanked Richert for this "op-
portunity to discuss ... the bogey of regimenta-
tion." The secretary assured his correspondent 
that he "did not propose to the Congress that 
farmers should be pushed around and regimented 
a lot," and made some general remarks about his 
recommended program. Richert was convinced; 
a few days later he wrote that this was "a fine 
program" and only wished "there would be some 
way of bringing the truth to the farmers."32 
Whether or not USDA officials were correct 
in assuming that the more people knew the 
more likely they were to support the Brannan 
plan, polls seemed to indicate a definite need for 
more information. In late May national polls 
revealed that farmers still did not fully under-
stand the program and were not convinced of its 
viability. Data also indicated that farmers were 
evenly split; they were not for the sliding scale 
of the Aiken Act but did not yet understand the 
Brannan plan. Lester F. Kimmel, a special 
correspondent for the Wichita Eagle, reported: 
Surveys being made by agrarian observers 
indicate that the farmer, as of now, is open-
minded. He is sitting back to see which party 
develops the program that seems most ad-
vantageous to him .... In poker parlance the 
Brannan plan sees the Republicans and raises 
them in almost every particular. 
The farmer was listening but had not yet re-
acted.33 
FARMERS' ORGANIZATIONS AND THE 
BRANNAN PLAN 
On the Great Plains, as elsewhere in the 
country, the Farm Bureau, National Grange, 
and conservative cooperatives were inclined 
toward the Republican view. Since the Farm 
Bureau was the most influential agricultural 
organization in the central Plains and the corn 
belt, the Republicans were in the strongest 
position. Most livestock producers, fearing an 
increase in feed-grain prices, also opposed the 
Brannan plan.34 But farmers and stock growers 
were not known for their group loyalty, and 
organizational influences also pulled them in 
the other direction. 
Most significant nationally, and especially 
on the northern Plains, was the Farmers Union, 
which gave the secretary's plan its most enthu-
siastic support. Brannan received many hearty 
letters of endorsement from state and local 
Farmers Unions throughout the country, but 
they were numerous from the northern Plains 
and upper Midwest-most notably the Dakotas, 
Montana, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michi-
gan. A St. Paul union official, for example, 
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decried his state's Farm Bureau for "tagging all 
of us as Anglophiles, [and] calling your 
[Brannan's] plan the 'British' Farm Program. 
We're steeping a cup of hot water in case there's 
another tea party."35 
Republicans, Congressman Hope included, 
were understandably concerned about these 
various alignments and the plan's political im-
plications. They were especially troubled by the 
active involvement of organized labor, which 
was second only to the NFU in its efforts for the 
Brannan proposal. "Most of the support," Hope 
wrote on 4 June, "is coming from the CIO 
[Congress ofIndustrial Organizations] and there 
is no doubt but what it is a CIO bill from start 
to finish. This very fact I am sure is going to 
make most farmers suspicious." Two weeks later 
he called the administration's proposal the "CIO 
Plan" and criticized the "so-called Farm Con-
ference" held by the Democrats in Des Moines 
the previous week. It was "mostly a rally by the 
Democrats and Labor leaders trying to get farm-
ers to support the repeal of the Taft-Hartley bill, 
and incidentally to support the Brannan Farm 
Plan." Hope believed the Brannan plan, be-
cause oflabor's substantial influence, gave more 
to consumers than to farmers. "I don't think," 
he wrote on 25 June, the new farm bill "should 
be the Brannan bill which is a CIO program or 
the Aiken bill which is too much of a United 
States Chamber of Commerce program."36 
DEFEAT OF THE BRANNAN PLAN 
Momentarily, in late June and early July, it 
appeared as if "a rather pale version of the 
Brannan plan" had a real chance. The so-called 
Pace-Brannan bill (H.R. 5345) provided for 
Brannan's income support standard and 100 
percent supports for Group 1 commodities but 
limited the application of production payments 
to no more than three commodities.37 Even this 
was more than most Brannan opponents could 
tolerate, and they got behind Albert A. Gore, 
Sr.'s (D., Tenn) one year extension of the 
existing program, which passed overwhelm-
ingly. All upper plains state congressmen, 
except Minnesota's, supported the Gore bill, 
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FIG. 4. President Harry S. Truman signing the rural telephone bill, 28 October 1949. Secretary of Agriculture 
Charles F. Brannan (third from left) looks on; as do other government officials (former secretary of agriculture and 
REA Administrator Claude R. Wickard, third from right) and representatives of interested farm organizations. USDA 
photograph courtesy of Harry S. Truman Library. 
which was, in essence, a vote to kill the Brannan 
plan.38 
The administration's proposal was indeed 
dead for 1949, as it had even less support in the 
Senate. But with the secretary and his support-
ers looking toward 1950, the fight was still 
important. Proponents and opponents expected 
the plan to be a major issue in the next congres-
sional campaign. In August Hope thought the 
Brannan plan was "dead for the time being," 
but, he cautioned, the GOP must be ready to 
"meet it as an issue in 1950."39 
Republicans had no intentions of allowing 
themselves to be bushwhacked in farm states 
again and launched their drive for a 1950 farm 
program at a Sioux City, Iowa, farm conference 
in late September 1949. Although billed as a 
non-partisan conference that did include repre-
sentatives from the opposition camp, the politi-
cal implications of the conference were clear. 
Participants sought a GOP alternative to the 
"Brannan or Bust" farm plan, but the party's 
National Committee chairman insisted that 
the farm problem "should not become the foot-
ball of partisan politics." Conference keynoter 
Clifford Hope repeated the charge that the 
Brannan program was actually the plan of orga-
nized labor; that being the case, he asked, why 
was it not tried on labor first? "If high incomes 
and low prices are a good thing for the farmer, 
why aren't high incomes and low wages a good 
thing for working people?" The consumer would 
benefit in many ways if government were to 
adopt a "low wage policy," and "if the Brannan 
plan advocates are right, workers wouldn't lose 
because the Government would give them a 
check every so often to make up the difference 
between actual wages and a fair wage rate to be 
determined by the Government."40 
Back on Capitol Hill, a bill (S. 2522) intro-
duced by former secretary of agriculture, now 
senator, Clinton P. Anderson (D., N.M.) was 
gaining momentum. The AFBF had lent its 
strong support to the Anderson bill largely 
because it managed to incorporate the principle 
of flexible supports, and Senator Aiken de-
fended it as a strengthening of the Agricultural 
Act of 1948. For the most part Congressman 
Hope agreed: "It is not too different from the 
Hope-Aiken bill and I think it is an improve-
ment in some ways."41 As predicted, the Ander-
son bill finally passed the Senate in mid-Octo-
ber but the conference committee, in a manner 
reminiscent of the previous year, reported a 
compromise package-the Gore-Anderson bill, 
which became the Agricultural Act of 1949. 
The Brannan plan was dead, but high price 
supports lived on, as the Gore portion of the 
compromise again postponed the implementa-
tion of the sliding scale. It was, in essence, a 
victory for advocates of high mandatory price 
supports, southern Democrats and midwestern 
and western RepublicansY 
Unbeknownst to the administration and its 
Republican-Dixiecrat opposition, 1949 had been 
the first and last chance for the Brannan plan. 
Truman and Brannan geared up for a renewed 
battle for the secretary's proposal in 1950, but 
other events-McCarthy ism at home and the 
Korean War abroad-were to attract far more 
public attention and make another change in 
farm policy appear unwise. Brannan carried on 
the fight, but by midyear President Truman was 
fully occupied in other areas. The Brannan plan 
was an issue in some congressional campaigns 
that fall, but it was generally of secondary 
importance. Even in Iowa, where the adminis-
tration sponsored the senatorial candidacy of its 
under secretary of agriculture, Albert J. Loveland, 
the conservative Republican incumbent, Bourke 
B. Hickenlooper, won handily.43 In Kansas, 
early speculation notwithstanding, the Brannan 
plan had no perceptible impact, and the Repub-
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lican delegation to Congress was reelected. All 
were Brannan plan antagonists.44 
SIGNIFICANCE OF FARM POLICY DEBATE, 
1949-50 
The farm policy debate of 1949 and 1950 did 
not result in the enactment of an effective long-
range program, but it is of historical signifi-
cance. Certainly one cannot begin to compre-
hend the subsequent dialectic on farm issues 
without first looking at this episode. The argu-
ments that would dominate agricultural debate 
for years to come crystalized in 1949 and 1950. 
Plains state farmers who expressed support for 
the Brannan plan did so because they consid-
ered the old approach wholly inadequate and 
saw the administration's plan as a step toward 
greater social and economic equity. Those who 
opposed it did so because they feared excessive 
government spending, "creeping socialism," 
and the "regimentation" of the nation's agri-
cultural industry. Most opposed the Truman 
administration's initiatives in other domestic 
areas like federal housing, national health care, 
and aid to education for the same reasons. 
The result was a permanently refocused de-
bate: not on whether the federal government 
had a role in agriculture, but on what its role 
should be. The "old liberalism," which in-
cluded New Deal farm policy, had become the 
"new conservatism."45 A few, like the old anti-
New Deal curmudgeon Dan D. Casement of 
Manhattan, Kansas, were consistent in their 
opposition to all government largess and saw no 
fundamental difference between the old parity 
system and the Brannan plan. To this Great 
Plains farmer-stockman, efforts to "walk a mid-
dle course between statism and freedom" were 
"damned unrighteous."46 Most Kansans, how-
ever, had reconciled their basically conserva-
tive political ideology to the old methods of 
supporting farm prices-government loans, di-
rect purchases, acreage allotments, and market-
ing agreements. They were suspicious of the 
Brannan plan, which meant "junking the deeply 
imbedded system" that had "met with general 
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favor among farmers" for "an untried one."47 
They could not handle this next logical step, 
which included direct payments, more limits on 
production, and consumer subsidies. 
Congressman Hope, for one, recognized the 
inherent contradictions and, like many other 
farm legislators and their constituents, remained 
in a quandary with regard to the "farm prob-
lem." Hope was relatively conservative on most 
issues but had supported the principles of New 
Deal farm legislation. Although philosophi-
cally opposed to government interference in the 
marketplace, he came to accept the necessity of 
government price supports for agricultural com-
modities. In this respect, Hope reflected a 
general GOP dilemma. His was a pragmatic 
position dictated by the realization that farmers 
had been unable to solve the "farm problem" on 
their own. Some type of federal support system 
seemed the only way to compensate for 
agriculture's inherently unequal competitive 
position in relationship to the nonfarm sector of 
the economy.48 
One. can at least speculate that the majority 
of Hope's constituents, like people throughout 
the region, found themselves in a very similar 
political and philosophical quandary. Their 
opposition to the Brannan plan was an expres-
sion of their philosophy; their continued accep-
tance of the established farm support program 
was an exercise in pragmatism. Not surpris-
ingly, the search for an effective long-range 
policy for agriculture, like the nation's struggle 
to come to grips with many of its social ills, has 
been continually frustrated. 
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